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Mann: Constitutional Law: The Consumer's Right to Know--New First Amend

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE CONSUMER'S RIGHT TO KNOW
NEW FIRST AMENDMENT WEAPON IN THE WAR ON
PRICE-ADVERTISING BANS"

-

Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
Two non-profit organizations' and an individual whose health depended
on the use of prescription drugs2 filed suit against the Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy to void and enjoin enforcement of a state statute3 prohibiting
pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. Arguing before a
three judge federal district court, 4 plaintiffs alleged that the statute violated
their "right to know"5 guaranteed by the first amendment.6 Defendants
OEDITOR'S NOTE: This case comment was awarded the GEORGE W. MILAM AWARD as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the Summer 1976 quarter.
1. The organizations were the Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc. and The
Virginia State AFL-CIO. While the latter group may not be solely dedicated to consumer
causes, many of its members were alleged to be users of prescription drugs. 96 S. Ct. 1817,
1821 n.10 (1976). A suit by a different group to test the constitutionality of prohibitions
against advertising by attorneys is currently before the district court which heard the
instant case. Consumers Union v. ABA, Civ. No. 75-0105-R (E.D. Va., filed Feb. 27, 1975).
2. The Supreme Court recognized the woman was "suffer[ing] from diseases that
require[d] her to take prescription drugs on a daily basis." 96 S. Ct. at 1821 (footnote
omitted). It also noted how "[i]nformation as to who is charging what . . . [clould mean
the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities." Id. at 1827. But,
unlike the district court, the instant Court chose not to narrow the issue in the case
"to those consumers who vitally need the drugs." Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683, 685 (E.D. Va. 1974). The instant Court's
choice, if indeed it was consciously made, not to stress the individual plaintiff's vital
need for the drugs, might give rise to the inference that her plight was technically
irrelevant in reaching the decision. But the Supreme Court did comment that "[a]ppellees'
case . . . [was] a convincing one." 96 S. Ct. at 1826. The unique element of the assertion
of a first amendment right obfuscates the weight, if any, the woman's condition was
accorded in the decisional process.
3. VA. CODE ANN. §54-524.35(3) (1974). The law provided that a Virginia pharmacist
was guilty of unprofessional conduct if he "publish[ed], advertis[ed], or prompt[ed],
directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount,
rebate or credit terms . . . for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription."
Id. See 96 S. Ct. at 1819-20 & n.2.
4. 373 F. Supp. at 683. A different 3 judge federal district court had earlier upheld the
instant statute's inclusion of prescription drug price advertising as unprofessional conduct
for Virginia pharmacists. Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969).
5. The case of Kleindiensi v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (right to receive information
not as strong as government power to exclude aliens) was perhaps the first case which
strongly suggested the existence of a right to receive information under the first amendment. Until then, language dealing with a right to receive information was generally
considered dicta. See Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEo. L.J. 775, 778 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The
Right to Receive]; Comment, Commercial Speech Doctrine-A Clarification of the Pro-
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replied that such advertising was mere "commercial speech" undeserving of
any first amendment protection and therefore completely regulable.7 The
district court held for the consumer plaintiffs." On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed and HELD, that purely commercial speech in the
form of truthful information about entirely lawful activity may not be
completely suppressed by a state,9 that such speech receives the protection
of the first and fourteenth amendments, 0 and that a reciprocal first amendment "right to know" exists for consumers as the recipients of such speech.:"
Some expression has not been protected by the first amendment:

tection Afforded Advertising Under the First Amendment, 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNr U. L. REv.
797, 800 n.15. Whether the right to receive information is a right independent of the
speaker's rights would seem to be negated by the instant Court's declaration that "[i]f
there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising . . . "
96 S. Ct. at 1823. Additional language supporting the view that the speaker must be
completely protected before a right to receive commercial information will accrue can
be seen by the qualifications that the information be truthful and concerning "entirely
lawful activity." Id. at 1831. The suggestion has been made previously that the right to
receive information should be recognized as an independent right requiring a compelling
state interest before it can be controlled. See, The Right to Receive at 803. The instant
Court's requirement that any state regulation of commercial information advertising only
further a significant governmental interest (assuming alternative channels are provided
and the regulation is without reference to content) rather than a compelling one would
suggest that point has not yet been reached. 96 S. Ct. at 1830. But see 96 S. Ct. at 1823
n.15 ("The independent right of the listener to receive the information sought to be
communicated'); Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94, 104 (N.D.
Cal. 1975).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. For the origin of the notion that commercial speech is unprotected, see text
accompanying note 16 infra.
8. 373 F. Supp. at 683.
9. 96 S. Ct. at 1831. Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted that the consumers could have
obtained the information by telephone or in person. Id. at 1835 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The majority noted, however, that at least some pharmacies were refusing to quote by
telephone. Id. at 1821. In any event, the Court felt the ability of the listener to come by
the speaker's message by "seeking him out and asking him what it is" in no way
lessened the unconstitutionality of the state's suppression of the information. Compare id.
at 1823 n.15 with id. at 1831 ("What is at issue is whether a State may completely
suppress . . . .") (emphasis added). The district court's acceptance without inquiry of
the statute's having precluded access to the information has already been criticized as
"an unwarranted, heightened solicitude for and emphasis on the interests of the particular
complainants." Note, Professional Price Advertising Set Free?- Consumers' "Right to
Know" in Prescription Drug Price Advertising, 8 CONN. L. REv. 108, 125 (1975).
10. 96 S. Ct. at 1826. First amendment protection is applicable through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1819 n.l. The consumers had raised
the free expression argument before the district court originally, but dropped and reserved
it for argument before the Supreme Court, citing North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973). 373 F. Supp. at 685. Part of the reason
for the consumers' decision to drop the contention was undoubtedly the unsuccessful
use of a fourteenth amendment attack on the statute in the earlier case of Patterson Drug
Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969).
11. 96 S. Ct. at 1823.
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5
obscenity, 12 libel,' 3 "words of incitement,"' 4 and "fighting words."' The
notion that advertising and words of solicitation ("commercial speech") comprised another unprotected category originated in the case of Valentine v.
Chrestensen. 6 Years later it was noted that the decision had been "casual,
almost offhand,"'17 and that the Court's basis for the distinction in the first
place had been unclear. -8
In 1943 the Court rejected the assumption implicit in Valentine that
speech was always capable of being neatly categorized by labels such as

12. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
13. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. V.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
15. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
16. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Chrestensen, a Florida citizen, had brought a former U.S. Navy
submarine to New York City to exhibit for profit. Upon attempting to distribute commercial
handbills announcing the exhibit, he was told by Police Commissioner Valentine that a
municipal ordinance forbade distribution of such material but permitted the distribution
of handbills "devoted to 'information or a public protest.'" Id. at 53. Chrestensen then
attempted to redistribute the handbills after printing on the backs of the handbills a
protest against the City's action in denying him dockspace at a municipal pier. The
United States Supreme Court felt such action was clearly evasive and commented: "This
Court has unequivocally held that the streets are the proper place for the exercise of
the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though
the States and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public
interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." Id. at 54.
The New York City ordinance in Valentine has recently been declared unconstitutional
in light of the United States Supreme Court's instant decision. The New York Court of
Appeals has determined that a prohibition of handbill distribution in all public places
at all times and under all circumstances cannot be considered a reasonable regulation of
constitutionally protected speech. People v. Remeny, 19 CRIM. L. REP. 2366 (N.Y. Ct. App.
July 13, 1976). The concurring opinion by Judge Fuchsberg in the recent New York case
is notable for expressing the belief that the instant case completely disallows any differences
in regulation of commercial and non-commercial speech, because such regulation would
per se be based upon the speech's content. ld. This view seems clearly erroneous, however,
in view of the instant Court's language recognizing the possibility of "mere time, place,
and manner restrictions." 96 S. Ct. at 1830.
17. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 820 n.6 (citing Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
18. The assumption seems to have been that speech intimately bound up with
regulable commercial activity was at most a property right. Redish, The First Amendment
in the Market Place: Commercial Speech and Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 429, 430 (1971). It has also been noted that there is no clear indication that the
founding fathers or the framers of the fourteenth amendment considered protecting commercial advertising. Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L.
REv. 1191, 1195 & n.24 (1965). Although the idea that property rights and personal liberties
should be subject to dichotomization has been vigorously denied since Valentine (see
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972), the Court has frequently permitted
state legislatures to regulate certain areas of speech arguably worthy of first amendment
protection once a commercial element was introduced. Redish, supra at 458. The Court's
disinclination to embroil itself in questions of economic due process may be at the heart
of the problem. Redish, supra at 458.
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"commercial speech." 19 Confronted with speech whose hybrid character"
did not fit easily into the framework established by the Valentine ruling, the
Court declared the proper judicial focus should be the primary purpose of the
party claiming first amendment rights. Subsequently criticized as crude for
its stress on the irrelevant motivation of the speaker rather than the merits
of the language itself,21 the "primary purpose" approach was replaced 'in
1964 in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 2 with an analysis based on the informational content of the speech in question. The language of the advertisement in that case 23 was examined for information "of the highest public
interest and concern,"2 - and, if found to contain such, granted first amendment protection.2 5 However, the Court apparently believed that some instances
might still occur in which speech could be characterized as purely commercial

19. In a series of cases involving members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Court held
municipal ordinances prohibiting handbill distribution were unconstitutional when applied
to groups whose primary purpose was considered proseletyzing rather than solicitation.
See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (municipal ordinance prohibiting door-to-door
handbill solicitation violative of freedom of speech and press as applied to members of
religious sect); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (municipal license tax required
for solicitation violative of freedom of speech and religion as applied to members of religious
sect); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (municipal ordinance prohibiting all handbill
distribution violative of fourteenth amendment as applied to members of religious sect);
accord, Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943).
20. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). The Court stated: "Situations
will arise where it will be difficult to determine whether particular activity is religious or
purely commercial. The distinction at times is vital." Id. at 110.
21.

Note, Developments in the Law: Deceptive Advertising, 80

HARv.

L. REv. 1005, 1028

(1967; cf. Redish, supra note 18, at 452. The illogic of the focus on motivation
in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases surfaced in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
Redish, supra note 18, at 455. The Court in Breard upheld an ordinance which made it
a misdemeanor to enter unsolicited onto another's property for the purpose of selling
magazine subscriptions. Language of the Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, had suggested
that the defendants in that case were allowed to sell their books door-to-door because
their motivation was primarily religious. "mhe constitutional rights of those spreading
their religious beliefs through the spoken and printed word are not to be gauged by
standards governing retailers or wholesalers of books." 319 U.S. at 111. The anomalous
inference was possible that "because book dealers are in business to make money, their
first amendment rights appear somehow inferior to the constitutional protection afforded
those whose primary purpose is the dissemination of [religious] information." Redish,
supra note 18, at 455.
22. 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
23. The advertisement at issue was primarily a plea for financial support for the
Committee to Defend Martin Luther King. It included a detachable coupon with which
the reader could send in a contribution and listed grievances (subsequently found false)
alleged to have been committed on civil rights workers by southern officials. The Court
stated: "The publication here was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense in
which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion,
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of
a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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and therefore not worthy of protection. To this extent the Valentine decision
remained unaffected.

26

Hope for change in the Court's attitude accompanied the case of Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.?7 While
suggesting the "definitional balancing" approach 2 which the Court eventually
adopted in a later commercial speech case,29 the Court in Pittsburgh Press
Co. judicially side-stepped an opportunity to relax its posture on commercial
speech 30 although classic examples of commercial speech were involved. 31 The
decision not to grant first amendment protection was based on the illegal
nature of the particular advertisements, not their commercial nature per se.3 2
In the recent case of Bigelow v. Virginia,33 the Court strongly suggested
that "the notion of unprotected 'commercial speech' [had] all but passed from
the scene." 3 4 Content analysis was still employed,35 but personal (rather than
26. Id.
27. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). The Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations had given a
cease-and-desist order to a city newspaper to discontinue printing advertisements by employment agencies which displayed employment opportunities in sex-designated columns.
The Court refused to accept the newspaper's argument that editorial discretion involved in
printing such advertisements raised the issue of the editor's first amendment rights. Id.
at 387. The newspaper alternatively argued that "[c]ommercial speech should be accorded
a higher level of protection than Chrestensen and its progeny would suggest." Id. at 388.
28. Id. at 389. The Court implicitly saw the possibility of a "First Amendment interest
which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which
might arguably outweigh the governmental interest." Id. For discussion of the definitional
balancing approach, see note 46 infra.
29. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826-27 (1975).
30. 413 U.S. at 388. The Court stated: "Whatever the merits of this contention may be
in other contexts, it is unpersuasive in this case." Id.
31. Id. at 385.
32. Id. at 388.
33. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
34. 96 S. Ct. at 1824. A comparison between two cases subsequent to Bigelow but prior
to the instant case shows that at least one court felt any distinctive regulation to be
accorded commercial speech was impermissible in light of Bigelow. See California Citizen
Action Group v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(prohibition of prescription eyeglass price advertising unconstitutional). But in Millstone
v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976), a credit investigation agency's
reports were first identified as commercial speech, and then the governmental interest
in making such reports accessible to the public was balanced against the agency's first
amendment interest in nondisclosure. Not specifying whether the government's interest
need have been compelling or merely of greater weight than the agency's interest in
order to prevail, the court held for the government and thereby deemed the reports in
question regulable. 528 F.2d at 833. In light of the instant case, the Millstone court's
definitional balancing approach was appropriate while the decision of the California court
in California Citizen Action Group was premature and overbroad. Whether a "total
demise" view of Valentine is proper even after the instant case is doubtful. See 96 S. Ct. at
1830 ("In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of
course do not hold that it can never be regulated in any way."). But see People v. Remeny,
19 CRIM. L. REP. 2366 (N.Y. Ct. App., July 13, 1976) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
35. Content analysis refers to the Court's approach in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), wherein ads dealing with "matters of the highest public interest
and concern" were protected under the first amendment. Id. at 266. The Bigelow Court
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political) subject matter of high public interest triggered first amendment
protection for an advertisement- 8 even when the information conveyed was
incidental to the commercial proposal. 37 Nevertheless, confusion persisted due
to the fundamental right which was the subject matter involved in the advertisement, 3 and the appellant's identity as a newspaper editor.3 9 By inference, purely commercial speech was still outside the aegis of first amendment protection 4 0
Prior to the instant Court's ruling lower courts had addressed the issue
of the constitutionality of state statutes banning prescription drug price
advertising on seven occasions. 4 ' The attacks primarily consisted of due process
arguments under state and federal constitutions. 42 The instant statute had been
attacked once before43 however, the plaintiffs in that suit were a drug

merely made the use of the test, implicit in New York Times Co., more apparent. Comment,
The First Amendment Status of Commercial Advertising, 54 N.C. L. REV. 468, 473-74 (1976);

see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975).
36.

See 421 U.S. at 822; Comment, Commercial Speech Doctrine-A Clarification of

the Protection Afforded Advertising Under the First Amendment, supra note 5, at 810.
37. See 421 U.S. at 822; Comment, The First Amendment Status of Commercial Advertising, supra note 35, at 474.
38. The advertisement was for an abortion referral service in New York City. 421
U.S. at 812.
39. Id.

40. See, e.g., Comment, First Amendment Freedom of Speech Protection for Com-

inercial Advertising, 42 TENN. L. Rv. 573, 579 (1975).

41. See Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(statute prohibiting prescription drug price advertising violative of consumers' right to
know under first amendment), alfd mem. 18 S. Ct. 2617 (1976); Patterson Drug Co. v.
Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969) (statute defining unprofessional conduct for
pharmacists so as to include prescription drug price advertising unconstitutional); Florida
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1969) (statute prohibiting
prescription drug price advertising unconstitutional); Stadnick v. Shell's City, Inc., 140
So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962) (pharmacy board rule prohibiting advertising of names or prices
of prescription drugs unconstitutional for failure to bear reasonable relation to public safety,
health, morals, or general welfare); Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-a-Lot, Inc., 270 Md.
103, 311 A.2d 242 (Md. Ct. App., 1973) (statute defining unprofessional conduct for
pharmacists so as to include prescription drug price advertising violative of due process
clause of fourteenth amendment of United States Constitution and article 23 of Maryland
State Constitution for failure to bear reasonable relation to state objectives); Supermarkets
General Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super. 326, 225 A.2d 728 (Ch. 1966) (statute defining unprofessional conduct for pharmacists so as to include prescription drug price advertising unconstitutional exercise of police power); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor,
441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487 (1971) (statute prohibiting prescription advertising unconstitutional for failure to bear reasonable relation to state objectives).
42. See Note, supra note 9, at 108. See also note 41 supra. The first amendment issue
was addressed in just two cases. In Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp.
94 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affd mem., 18 S. Ct. 2617 (1976), a consumer vitally dependent on
prescription drugs successfully asserted a first amendment right to know to enjoin enforcement of a state statute prohibiting all prescription drug advertising. A first amendment
attack failed in Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969), where
an action was brought by a drug company and an individual pharmacist.
43. 305 F. Supp. at 821.
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company and an individual pharmacist,4 4 not "consumers who vitally need[ed]
the drugs" 5 asserting a right to know under the first amendment.
The Supreme Court analyzed the instant case using the definitional
balancing method.4 6 Recognizing that earlier cases had held a right to receive information existed co-extensively with a speaker's rights, 47 the Court
was confronted squarely with determining if "there is a [f]irst [a]mendment
exception for 'commercial speech' . . . .... 4 The Court reasoned that since
economic motives among contestants in labor union cases 49 did not negate
their first amendment rights, economic motivation should not preclude similar
first amendment protection for advertisers5s
The competing interests were then identified. 51 The Court noted that
the consumer's interest in low prices through the free flow of advertising information might often be stronger on a daily level than in constitutionally
protected speech on political matters, especially among the old and sick
52
who spend a disproportionate share of their funds on prescription drugs.
In attempting to find a public interest," the Court reflected an unwillingness
to abandon completely the Meiklejohn view that only speech which is public
in nature should be protected.5 4 In deciding that commercial speech should
44. Id. at 823. The district court felt that the differing natures of the plaintiffs'
identities in the Patterson case and the instant case were distinctions running to the
merits. See 373 F. Supp. at 685-86.
45. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp.
683, 685 (1974).
46. Definitional balancing is perhaps best seen as a three step process whereby: (1) the
scope of a constitutional guarantee is functionally defined for each context (e.g., price
regulation, control of obscenity) by determining the basic purposes underlying our system
of free expression at its inception, (2) a judgment is made on whether the government
control being challenged bears a sufficiently close nexus to the particular objective it seeks
to achieve (that objective having first been determined at the definitional stage to be
consistent with the basic underlying purposes of the system), and (3) the competing
interests of the government and its challenger are weighed against each other. See, e.g.,
Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Emerson, Toward a General Theory
of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 914-17 (1963); Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and
Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg- and Beyond, 1969 Sup. Cr. Rrv. 41, 59-64.
One probable drawback of any balancing approach is the demand such makes on the
court to weigh competing interests which perhaps have never been weighed against each
other before. For an example of this problem, see Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc.,
528 F.2d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 1976).
47. See 96 S. Ct. at 1823 ("If there is a right to advertise there is a reciprocal
right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by these appellees.").
48. Id. at 1825.
49. Id. at 1826. The Court placed heavy emphasis on its decision in NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See also 96 S. Ct. 1833-34 (Stewart, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 1826. See also id. at 1833-34 (Stewart, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 1826-27.
52. Id. The 1974 per capita drug expenditures of persons over the age of 65 were
more then twice that for all other age groups. 96 S. Ct. at 1826 n.18 (citing Mueller &
Gibson, Age Differences in Health Care Spending, 38 FISCAL YEAR 1974, SOCIAL SEcutrrY
BULL. 5 (No. 6,1975)).
53. See 96 S. Ct. at 1827.
54. It is generally accepted that the views of Professor Alexander Meiklejohn have
been an influence on the Court. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 18, at 434; see generally,
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not be categorically seen as having no public function to justify its expression,
the Court argued that it would be difficult to draw a line between advertising
on subjects only of public interest and advertising important to selfgovernment.5 5 Even if an ad were lacking public interest that was immediately
discernible, the Court suggested that almost any subject could be considered
as having a public interest element, and if not, "[t]here are few to which
such an element could not be added." 56 The Court also felt informational
advertising about any subject was important if for no more than affecting
the aggregate of personal economic decisions made as a result of exposure
to such information. 57 The Court implicitly felt that the proper allocation of
resources will come about only through the greatest informational exposure
possible, and analogously, information indispensable to the success of the
free enterprise system must be indispensable to the government in a free
enterprise economy. 58 Hence commercial speech should be seen as ultimately
imbued with a public rather than a private character. 59
The judicial balancing that followed pitted the state's interest in maintaining high professional standards- against the combined weights of the
consumer's first amendment right to know, the public's interest in the most
advantageous allocation of resources, and the advertiser's newly revealed
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment,

79 HARv. L. Riv. 1 (1965). Professor Meiklejohn's view of the function of the first amendment is that "[t]he First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern.' It is
concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility."
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REV. 245, 255.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 1827.
56. Id.

57. Id.
58. The view that the success of American democracy is so inextricably entwined with
capitalist economic theory was criticized, ironically perhaps, by the Court's most conservative member in a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1836 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]here
is certainly nothing in the United States Constitution which requires the Virginia legislature to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith .

.

. .'). The instant decision was a 7-1 split.

Justice Stevens took no part in the decision, thus making Justice Rehnquist's position in
the extreme minority. While Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart did file concurring
opinions, the reasons for their writing separately would seem to be (1) to allow Chief
Justice Burger to express his view that the Court's decision was narrowly confined to
advertising by pharmacists and not other professionals, because of the minimal amount of
professional discretion exercised in filling the common prescription, id. at 1831, and (2) to
allow Justice Stewart to emphasize that there remain "important differences between
commercial price and product advertising, on the one hand, and ideological communication
on the other," id. at 1834, and that ideological expression will continue to be held to
no standard of veracity because factual claims as to tangible goods and services are more
capable of empirical testing and regulation. See id. at 1835.
59. Id. at 1827. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
60. How strong the Court views a state's interest in this regard is rather uncertain.
It may have been crucial in tipping the judicial scales in the consumers' favor. Compare
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 733, 792 (1975) ("We recognize that the States
") (emphasis added) with
have a compelling interest in the practice of professions ....
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1828
("Mhe State has a strong interest in maintaining that professionalism.') (emphasis
added).
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interest in free speech when truthful information about entirely lawful
activity is being conveyed.6c The Board's belief that low cost, high volume,
unprofessional drug retailers would consume the market was recognized as a
possibility, 2 but the assumption that people in a democracy will be the best
protectors of their own interests through open channels of communication
was felt to be a sufficient countervailing force.63 Indeed, the Court decided
the statute must fail precisely because it denied consumers the chance to
decide for themselves.6
The Court carefully limited its holding so that states may continue to
regulate advertising under certain conditions.6 5 Advertising regulations made
without reference to content and which are "mere time, place, and manner
restrictions" while leaving open "ample alternative channels for communication" were sanctioned as long as they serve "a significant governmental interest."'6 6 In addition, the state's ability to regulate false advertising was reaffirmed. 67 Furthermore, the decision did not apply to "the special problems
of the electronic broadcast media." 68 The question of a state's power to
regulate price advertising by other professions was expressly reserved since
filling the average prescription was more akin to dispensing a product than
providing a professional service. 69
70
While solid support exists for the holding of the Court in public policy,
61. 96 S. Ct. at 1828-30.
62. Id. at 1829.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1829-80.
65. For an opinion expressing the belief that no regulation of commercial speech can
be allowed in light of the instant decision because it would be a per se regulation with
reference to content, see the concurring opinion of Judge Fuchsberg in People v. Remeny,
19 Cam. L. REP. 2366 (N.Y. Ct. App., July 13, 1976) and text accompanying note 16 supra.
66. 96 S. Ct. 1830. The Court's rationale for continuing regulation of commercial
speech is that (1) the truth of commercial speech is ordinarily more capable of objective
verification as it typically espouses the merits of a specific product, and (2) there is
little likelihood regulations will chill advertising "[s]ince advertising is the sine qua non
of commercial profits." Id. at 1830 n.24.
67. Id. at 1833-35 (Stewart, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 1831.
69. Id. at 1831-32 & n.25 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
70. It was stipulated by the parties in the case that drug prices varied from outlet
to outlet in parts of Virginia with a price differential of as much as 650%. Id. at 1821
n.11. The morality of such high pricing becomes questionable when a prime factor in
raising the cost is the large sums of money spent yearly by the major drug firms on promotional campaigns aimed at "cornering" a portion of the drug market (i.e., convincing
individual physicians that they should prescribe a drug by the manufacturer's brand name
rather than by its generic name). See Comment, Prescription Drug Pricing in California:
An Analysis of Statutory Causes and EfFects, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 340, 344-45 (1961). Other
equally condemnable causes for the high prices of prescription drugs are price-fixing and
that portion of the charge for a prescription drug which is a fee for the "professional
service" involved. Id. at 349 n.43. "The Court note[d] that roughly 95% of all prescriptions are filled with dosage units already prepared by the manufacturer and sold to the
pharmacy in that form .... In dispensing these items, the pharmacist performs three tasks:
he finds the correct bottle; he counts out the correct number of tablets or measures the
right amount of liquid; and he accurately transfers the doctor's dosage instructions to the
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its logical underpinning was weak in several respects. The service/product
distinction with reference to the pharmacist's role as opposed to the roles
of other professionals seems tenuous and equally applicable to lawyers performing title searches or doctors giving physical examinations. 71 The objectively verifiable nature of false advertising may be more illusory than
suggested;7 2 but even if advertising claims were always capable of being
empirically analyzed, the unrestricted freedom accorded dubious and potentially harmful political and religious speech creates a glaring inconsistency.- The Court's belief that the free flow of commercial information
will lead to the proper allocation of resources74 is blatantly inconsistent with
its subsequent recognition of "the dangers of its misuse if it is freely
available."75 What will be considered as ample alternative channels for communication-6 in determining the validity of advertising regulations appears
to require determination of the particular plaintiff's abilities to seek out
the information.7 7 The Court's notion that "people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed . . ."78 has never been
held to govern in certain other traditionally unprotected areas79 and the
80
consumer will still be subject to "loss leader" advertising.
8
The Court's discussion of the public interest factor ' is very confusing. It
first suggested any advertisement is capable of sufficient doctoring to include
such an interest, and therefore to require it is pointless. 8 2 But it then found
a public interest element in advertising's ultimate effect on resource allocation.83 If a public interest element was really no longer necessary in order
to afford first amendment protection, the Court should not have attempted

[I]t is clear that in this regard he no more renders a true professional
container ....
service than does a clerk who sells lawbooks." 96 S. Ct. at 1831 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
For a discussion of the disproportionate amount spent on prescription drugs by elder
Americans, see text accompanying note 52 supra.
71. Id. at 1838 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Note, supra note 9, at 118 & n.41.
72. See American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 104 (1902).
But see Liggett &.Myers Tobacco Co., 55 F.T.C. 354 (1958). See generally Note, supra note
21, at 1053-54.
73. See Note, supranote 21, at 1029-30.
74. 96 S. Ct. at 1827.
75. Id. at 1829.
76. Id. at 1830.
77. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
78. 96 S. Ct. at 1829.
79. See Paris Adult Theater v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (obscenity). The Court
stated: "[N]either the first amendment nor 'free will' precludes States from having 'blue
sky' laws to regulate what sellers of securities may write or publish about their wares.
Such laws are to protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible
from the exercise of their own volition." Id. at 64.
80. Note, sttpra note 9, at 113 n.40. Loss leader advertising refers to the practice of
advertising an item at below cost in order to draw customers, while at the same time
raising prices of other items which the customers will probably buy once inside the store.
81. 96 S. Ct. at 1827.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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